![]() While working largely within a framework of due process, Kennedy made overtures to the doctrine of the equal protection clause, suggesting that he imagines conduct (protected by the due process clause) and status (protected by the equal protection clause) in very close harmony with each other in the case of sexuality. It disallows moral legislation, but under exactly what standard of review? The answer is unclear. Kennedy's opinion, then, is perhaps an iteration of a halfway point between the doctrines, an idea of "rational basis review with teeth," that signifies the Court's willingness to apply strict scrutiny to classifications based on sexuality, but just not yet. But it must be argued that Kennedy's opinion is in fact something slightly more than rational basis review, for he stated that enforcing the morality of the majority can never be the state interest advanced by a law - an earth-shattering revelation if referring to rational basis review, but not truly groundbreaking if referencing a higher level of review. Such a definition of the right (accomplished without using the word " privacy", which seems the obvious doctrinal hook to Griswold) avoided defining sodomy itself as a specific and fundamental right, and instead simply stated that the state had no right to intrude upon intimate, adult and consensual relationships.īy avoiding the task of defining intimate, consensual and private conduct as a fundamental right, Kennedy certainly side-stepped strict scrutiny, forestalling the recognizing of homosexuals as a class protected by the higher standard of review - normally reserved for only race and national origin classifications. Kennedy defined Lawrence's rights under the Constitution at a high level of abstraction, arguing that the Texas statute violated the right to intimate conduct in an adult, consensual relationship. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy spoke for a majority of six Justices, in holding the law unconstitutional on the grounds of substantive due process. Holding of the Majority, by Justice Kennedy Lawrence would specifically overrule Bowers. 186, which held that regulations against sodomy were legal, because they were found to affect all citizens without differentiating between homosexual and heterosexual activities. ![]() ![]() Upon appeal, Lawrence and his partner's argument that the Texas statute on sodomy was unconstitutional based on the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment was rejected based on the precedent Bowers v. The statute made it clear that the statute only applied to homosexuals, and defined sodomy as sexual conduct per os or per anum, rather than the narrow understanding of the term in common parlance. ![]() The officer charged a violation of the Texas statute criminalizing sodomy between homosexuals. The dilemma in Lawrence arose when a police officer, visiting John Geddes Lawrence's home on an unrelated report of a weapons disturbance (which was later found to be false), accidentally observed him engaged in consensual homosexual conduct with his partner. 3 Concurring Opinion, by Justice Sandra Day O'Connorįacts of the Case, and Appellate Proceedings.2 Holding of the Majority, by Justice Kennedy.1 Facts of the Case, and Appellate Proceedings.
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